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BOOK REVIEW
Back to Conflicts Basics:
CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE

by Friedrich K. Juenger
Reviewed by Stanley E. Cox*

Chief Justice Stone is reported to have said that the study of conflict of
laws is a good substitute for a more formal course on legal jurisprudence.'
Conflicts theories, among other things, at their heart address issues of
how "true" laws are, how much respect governments should give to other
sovereigns or to private agreements, and what role the judiciary should
play as lawmaker or law interpreter. Discussions about how to choose
law are in essence discussions about what constitutes justice. A good
book on conflicts should provoke foundational thinking about such issues
and other basics of the conflicts discipline. Choice of Law and Multistate
Justice2 does.
I.

A

QUICK OVERVIEW

Professor Juenger's thesis is that the only sensible choice-of-law theory
is to apply the best substantive law to interstate and international disputes.3 Whether one agrees or disagrees with this thesis, it is refreshing
to read a conflicts monograph that argues consistently at the foundational
level and pursues its thesis from introduction to conclusion. Borrowing
* Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law. A.B. Harvard College,
1974; M.A.T. Duke University, 1975; H.Dip. Trinity College, University of Dublin, 1978;
J.D. University of Kentucky, 1987. I thank the following for reading and commenting on
previous drafts: Pat Borchers, Davalene Cooper, Malcolm Donahue, Thom Fischer, Kevin
Johnson, Larry Kramer, Curt Nyquist, Bruce Posnak, Mike Solimine, Rhonda Wasserman
and Russell Weintraub. I also thank Fritz Juenger for graciously taking the time to read a
late draft of this work and pointing out to me places where I may not have understood his
position. That I may still misconstrue his theories, have not taken all of everyone's advice,
and may be making errors of other sorts is of course my responsibility rather than the fault
of any of these commentators.
1. See Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L.
REv. 1210, 1210 (1946).
2. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993).
3. Id. at 236.
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from his multitudinous prior conflict writings 4 and specifically building on
his Hague General Course on private international law,5 Professor
Juenger presents in this book the essence of his conflicts theory, and attacks others' conflicts theories. For those already familiar with Professor
Juenger's views, Choice of Law and MultistateJustice productively distills
and reinforces. For those not so familiar with Professor Juenger's previous, significant contributions to the literature, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice serves as an impressive introduction to his conflicts thinking
while straightforwardly setting forth his conflicts ideology.
The book is divided into five chapters. The introduction sets forth the
facts of three illustrative cases6 and introduces conflicts terminology.
Chapter I provides a historical overview, emphasizing the recurrence of
fundamental conflicts themes. Professor Juenger also introduces in this
chapter the sub-theme that more modern theories have added little or
nothing to conflicts jurisprudence. Chapter II criticizes what Professor
Juenger categorizes as the classical multilateralist approach, for vainly
seeking to develop rules identifying which geographically based law must
be applied to a conflicts dispute. Chapter III criticizes the twentieth-century, American conflicts revolution, both for pretending that it has developed anything new, but more fundamentally for failing to resolve
conflicts problems. Although this chapter pours the most vitriol on interest analysis as a form of narrow-minded unilateralism, it also indicts other
theories, such as the proper law approach (merely reviving another form
4. See id at 242 (collecting works in the bibliography section of the book); FRIEDK. JUENGER, THE LEX MERCATORIA AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, in LEX MERCATORIA & ARBITRATOR (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Babcock v. Jackson Revisited: Judge Field's Contribution to American Conflicts Law, 56
ALB. L. REV. 727 (1993); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort
Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REv. 907 (1994); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A
Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1984); Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105; Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of
History, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419 (1984); Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention
in Jurisdictionand Choice of Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 907 (1981);
Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 509 (1985).
5. Professor Juenger initially delivered these lectures in 1983, and they were published in Volume 193 of the Academy's Collected Courses. See JUENOER, supra note 2, at
ix.
6. Professor Juenger uses the following three cases to demonstrate how his conflicts
theory works and the types of problems that any conflicts theory must address. In re Paris
Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (involving a mass tort); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (involving multinational corporations,
an incident in international waters, and a choice of forum clause); Cardo v. Cardo, Judgment of 11 July 1968, 94 BGE II 65 (involving a domestic relations case with spouses of
different nationalities); see also infra notes 55-96 and accompanying text (discussing how
Professor Juenger's and the author's choice-of-law approaches would resolve these cases).
RICH
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of failed multilateralism) 7 and the Second Restatement (a jumbling together of disparate theories and portions of theories).8 In Chapter IV
Professor Juenger reexamines the failings and occasional successes of
competing theories in light of his belief that only theories allowing teleology to play a significant de facto role in conflict decisions will be implemented by courts. Finally, Chapter V more explicitly explains and
defends the teleological/better law approach and concludes by explaining
how Professor Juenger's theory would resolve the three cases introduced
at the beginning of the book.

II. THREE CHEERS FOR SOLuTiONS
Before criticizing Professor Juenger's better law argument in more detail, it is important to praise Professor Juenger for advocating a conflicts
solution rather than just attacking others' offerings. A readiness to explain how real cases should be decided is something anyone disposed to
enter the "dismal swamp"9 of conflicts theorizing should be prepared to
do.' ° To be sure, Professor Juenger's strong criticism of his opponents'
views constitutes a significant amount of attempted "weeding" of the conflicts garden, but just as importantly, he also attempts to plant in the garden." It is important to plant, rather than just weed, for two reasons
having to do with both the practical application and the underlying force
of conflicts theory.
On the practical side, courts apply conflicts theories to real cases.
Courts employ, or at least say they are employing, theories such as vested
rights, most significant connection, interest analysis, or better law to cases
involving multistate elements.' 2 A theorist who only attacks the inade7. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 97, 128-31.

8. See id.at 105-06, 142-43.
9. See William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953),
quoted in JUENGER, supra note 2, at 1.
10. For the most recent attempt by a diverse panel of conflicts and procedure scholars
to apply their theories to various facts, see the forthcoming symposium on "Jurisdiction,
Justice and Choice of Law for the 21st Century," including applications by Robert Bone,
Patrick Borchers, Robert Brussack, Stephen Burbank, Larry Kramer, Harold Maier, Linda
Mullenix, Martin Redish, Linda Silberman, Michael Solimine, Allan Stein, Russell Weintraub, and the author to various hypothetical and real facts in 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995). The symposium issue is the written work product of a conference held at
New England School of Law on October 28-29, 1994.
11. See David F. Cavers, 56 HARV. L. R1v. 1170, 1172-73 (1943) (using the weeding
and garden metaphor, while reviewing WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942)).
12. For a recent argument that conflicts theory is largely irrelevant to the decisions
that courts make in cases involving multistate facts, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal
Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1994).
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quacies of others' theories provides nothing that is likely to prompt a
busy court to change the way it adjudicates. Courts can utilize Professor
Juenger's ideas. His factual examples help readers understand what his
theory means and how it should be applied.
On the foundational side, until and unless a conflicts theorist attempts
to answer rather than merely raise conflicts problems, a strong risk exists
that the theorist does not yet fully appreciate the problems that any conflicts theory attempts to address. It is easy to criticize a theory for not
adequately promoting interstate harmony, for denigrating predictability
concerns, or for downplaying justice in the individual case. But a conflicts theory inevitably emphasizes certain aspects of conflicts problems
over others. 3 The honest developer or proponent of a theory recognizes
that her theory cannot solve all of the potential concerns in the conflicts
situation equally well.
The attacked theorist who is honest about what she is advocating may
respond in one of two ways. She may either explain why the concerns not
adequately addressed by her position do not truly matter, 14 or, alternatively, that her theory correctly prioritizes the different aspects of conflicts doctrine that jostle against each other for attention. Instead of just
criticizing others' theories for not perfectly "solving" some single aspect
of the conflicts conundrum, the more complete theorist shows that she
understands the interrelatedness of conflicts doctrines by demonstrating,
via application, what she would emphasize at the expense of other aspects
of conflicts dogma. When Professor Juenger applies his theory to real
fact patterns, he thereby allows others to demonstrate whether they could
solve the problems better. He also demonstrates that he, at least partially,' 5 appreciates the interrelated nature of conflicts problems.
13. The common wisdom, for instance, is that a rule-type, multilateralist theory like
vested rights emphasizes predictability, uniformity, and respect for the interests of other
sovereigns. Conversely, a theory such as better law is thought to emphasize fairness to

individual litigants.
14. For example, one could argue that these concerns are insoluble under any theory
for resolving conflicts.
15. I argue, in contrast to Professor Juenger's approach, that limited sovereignty
places important restrictions on a state's or nation's ability to apply law to interstate or
international facts. See infra notes 26-54 and accompanying text. This criticism may be
viewed as indicting Professor Juenger for failing to explore: (1) the interrelation of choice
of law with the need to place restrictions on jurisdiction; and (2) the problems of recognition of foreign judgments, once choice-of-law decisions have been made. See P.E. Nygh,
Book Review, 67 AusTR. L. J. 802, 803 (1993) (criticizing Multistate Justice for failing to
address sufficiently the interrelationship between jurisdiction, recognition, and choice of

law). Professor Juenger's decisions to downplay the ramifications of what I believe are
related doctrines, however, seem to be deliberate rather than an oversight, and motivated
by his uncompromising view that the primary goal of conflicts jurists should be to do substantive justice.
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III.

PROFESSOR JUENGER'S ARGUMENT FOR BETTER LAW

Professor Juenger places substantive concerns atop his conflicts hierarchy, hence the emphasis on multistate justice in the book title. Professor
Juenger always prefers multistate justice over cold rules, interstate harmony, or presumed predictability. In attacking other theories, Professor
Juenger contends that emphasizing better substantive law does not lead
to any greater interstate disharmony or lack of predictability than exists
under other theories.1 6 Professor Juenger's faith is that, through an emphasis on the substantive result, other aspects of conflicts theory necessarily will fall into place.
In establishing his argument, Professor Juenger categorizes all conflicts
theories into one of three types: multilateralist, unilateralist, or substantive law approach.17 Professor Juenger views the essence of the multilateralist approach as seeking, from among competing domestic laws, for
one that, based on particular litigation contacts, most appropriately govems the dispute. He thus herds together into the same multilateralist
flock proponents of all forms of seat-of-relationship tests (such as Savigny), adherents to vestedness (such as Beale), and proponents of nationality or domicile as the controlling basis for choice of law."8 Professor
Juenger also characterizes as multilateralist more modem choice-of-law
theories, such as the Second Restatement, that, though purporting to balance competing considerations, merely choose from among competing
domestic laws the one deemed appropriate for the particular issue involved in the conflicts litigation. In Professor Juenger's view, the common failing of all such multilateralist approaches is their doomed search
for the one domestic law that best fits the particular cross-boundary
transaction being litigated. Because a domestic law seldom properly fits
an interstate transaction, the vain search by multilateralists for a single
connecting factor to take precedence in selecting such an irrelevant law
always hinders, rather than assists, the search for multistate justice.' 9
Professor Juenger similarly faults unilateralism for misguidedly attempting to apply domestic law to interstate transactions. The essence of
unilateralism, in Professor Juenger's view, is to myopically focus on how
16. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 2, at 156.
17. See id. at 45-46. Professor Juenger's teleological approach is the substantive law
approach against which he evaluates the two other forms of competing theories.
18. See id at 41-42 (discussing Mancini's nationality theories).
19. Additionally, so long as multilateralists disagree as to what connecting factors
should take precedence to determine what one law should be applied to a transaction (and
there is always likely to be such disagreement, Savigny and Beale to the contrary), multilateralists cannot achieve even the lesser "virtue" of predictability for interstate transactions sometimes advocated on behalf of multilateralist systems.
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far the domestic laws of a particular forum are designed to reach. This
attempt almost always founders because most domestic laws were not
designed to reach international facts. Therefore, the attempt to construe
their reach usually stretches them beyond recognition.2" Alternatively,
even if one sovereign's domestic laws could be construed to reach international fact patterns, these laws do not necessarily have the substantive
content that would best accomplish multistate justice. The parochialism
of extending one nation's law as far as it can reasonably be stretched is
not, in Professor Juenger's view, the best way to accomplish true justice.2
Professor Juenger equates, as quintessential unilateralists, the oftenoverlooked German conflicts scholar Waichter and the seldom-overlooked American conflicts scholar Brainerd Currie. Although Professor
Juenger, like many other conflicts scholars, has particularly sharp words
of criticism for Currie's ideas and methodology, 22 when unilateralist theory is applied to facts, Professor Juenger does not strongly fault unilateralists for ignoring the concerns of other potentially interested
jurisdictions. In Juenger's view, the natural "homing tendency" that
judges applying most conflicts theories use sometimes can lead to improved interstate justice. By ignoring the more or less arbitrary requirements that multilateralists espouse, and instead applying forum law of
superior substantive content, the unilateralist, in Professor Juenger's
view, sometimes indirectly achieves something approximating multistate
justice. 23 But such results are not due to any inherent strength of unilateral theory or technique since, according to Professor Juenger, unilateralism lacks coherent or defensible foundations. Rather the lex fori justice
sometimes achieved by unilateralism derives serendipitously and randomly from the fact that unilateralism necessarily rejects the arbitrary
rules advocated by multilateralists.
In sum, multilateralists and unilateralists are alike, according to Professor Juenger, in that both vainly seek to identify domestic law that should
apply to interstate transactions. 4 Instead, both theories should be abandoned, and focus should be placed on the unique nature of the interstate
or international occurrences that give rise to conflicts problems. The conflicts situation cries out for the formation of new law that transcends sovereignty (i.e., transcends the domestic situation), and more appropriately
addresses interstate or international concerns.25 It is no accident that
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 133-35.
See id at 136.
See infra note 99.
See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 2, at 148, 157, 161-62. But cf id. at 139.
See, e.g., i at 154.
See id at 136, 160-61.
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Professor Juenger starts and closes his book with approving reference to
the flexibility achieved by the ancient Roman praetorperegrinus, who
fashioned a ius gentium that was not local law, but special substantive law
designed to address the problems presented by non-domestic situations.
The proper formulator of successful conflicts decisions, in Professor
Juenger's model, is the sensitive judge freed from the constraints of sovereignty to fashion enlightened substantive law appropriate for the multistate situation.
IV. A

RESPONSE DEFENDING UNILATERALISM (OR THREE CHEERS
FOR LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY)

The way a problem is constructed often determines its resolution. By
defining multilateralism and unilateralism as firmly focused upon limited
domestic law rather than upon multistate substantive justice, Professor
Juenger reserves to his preferred version of teleology the only chance to
accomplish true substantive justice. If multilateralists always seek arbitrary rules pointing to imperfect domestic laws, while unilateralists similarly never rise above interpretation and application of purely domestic
law, then Professor Juenger correctly insists that the answer to conflicts
problems lies elsewhere. If Professor Juenger's categorizations, however,
mistakenly shade these other theories rather than fashion full-bodied portraits, or if his vision of transcendent substantive law is itself wraith-like
or otherwise evanescent, then it may be that the contrast between what is
achievable under alternative theories is not so stark as Professor Juenger
paints it to be.2 6

I leave it to others to explain how a multilateral approach may incorporate transcendent substantive content as an important component of its

26. I do not mean to criticize unduly Professor Juenger's or any other writer's attempt
to paint broadly and clearly. To borrow the William James' insight, if the conflicts world
without imposed order is merely buzzing, bumbling confusion, only by attempting to dis-

cern or impose some order on that world do we offer the possibility of accomplishing a
form of justice that means more than happenstance in the individual case. By also writing
as if conflicts theory matters, I agree with Professor Juenger that the attempt to impose

order on conflicts cases is a worthwhile effort. See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Razing Conflicts
Facades to Build Better Jurisdiction Theory: The Foundation-ThereIs No Law but Forum

Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1993) (suggesting that recognizing the interrelationship of
jurisdiction and the ability to apply forum law is the foundational starting place for the

construction of sensible jurisdictional theory).

532
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methodology.2 7 Instead, albeit with reservation, 28 I accept Professor
Juenger's implied invitation tO defend unilateralist approaches to choice
of law. Professor Juenger's dismissal of unilateralism and defense of transcendent better law seem never to answer satisfactorily two related foundational questions about conflicts situations: (1) by what authority do
judges render conflicts decisions; and (2) why should those who did not
render a conflicts decision respect it?
Presumably, for Professor Juenger, the need to fashion law to fit multistate fact patterns is what empowers judges to create it, and the effectiveness or moral and rational force of superior substantive law is what
makes it binding on other communities. Accordingly, Professor Juenger is
hostile to theories that claim to limit a judge's ability to fashion the
proper interstate or international law. Professor Juenger does not hide
his distaste for legal positivism;2 9 he advocates, in the American context,
that courts overrule Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 30 and reinstitute the
Swift v. Tyson 3 l approach of creating and applying the best substantive
law possible.3 2
27. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Choosing Law with an Eye on the Prize, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 705 (1994) (critiquing Professor Juenger's views from a largely multilateral perspective). As an example of an eclectic multilateralist approach, the Second Restatement
provides through its mandate to consider "the needs of the interstate and international
systems" and "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law," enough flexibility
for a court to fashion particular substantive rules that somewhat transcend normal domestic law application. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFI cr OF LAWS § 6 (1971). I
emphasize, however, that I do not make such a defense for multilateralism, only that it
arguably can be made. I also emphasize that I am not entirely comfortable with the dichotomous (or trichotomous) categorizations into schools or camps that we conflicts scholars
seem so eager to make. By defining those who hold different theories as "les autres," we
invite ourselves to stop listening to anything significant (or significantly different from
others we previously have lumped into their camp) the others might say. For purposes of
this review, however, I place myself within the unilateralist camp that Professor Juenger
has constructed, and I attempt to defend that position in terms that try to respond to Professor Juenger's arguments.
28. See supra note 27.
29. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 159.
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that a federal court may exercise independent
judgement and is not bound by state common law), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. JUENGER, supra note 2, at 165-67. Patrick Borchers, a former student of Professor
Juenger, recently revived the Erie debate specifically as it relates to conflict of laws decisions. Borchers argues that Erie may not rest on any currently defensible constitutional
premise and advocates that federal courts therefore should feel free to fashion federal
common law to govern interstate conflicts. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction,the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon,
72 TEX. L. REv. 79 (1993).
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In defending a form of unilateralism, I do not deride Professor
Juenger's search for transcendent substantive law as a vain quest for a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky."3 3 I agree with Professor Juenger
that the forum always should fashion the best substantive law possible to
address any litigation properly before it. This does not mean, however,
that the forum should seek law outside of its own sphere of influence or
should try to apply law to situations outside of its proper sphere of influence. Because I fear that Professor Juenger's transcendent law approach
invites forums to do both, I prefer a version of what he no doubt would
label unilateralism.
It may prove helpful to compare the search for multistate justice with
the problems of governmental injustice that Henry David Thoreau more
generally explored in Civil Disobedience.3"Thoreau's ultimate quest was
for better law, which meant, for him, engaging in and encouraging the
best possible course of conduct, independent of what any particular government advocated or permitted. He rejected any positivism that claims
for government alone the right to define superior moral conduct. As
35
Thoreau wrote, "[c]an there not be a government [of] ... conscience?
One does not have to accept Thoreau's individualist,no-government solution to believe that government has no monopoly on truth or justice.
Whether based in sectarian or religious communities, families (however
defined), or individuals, there are alternative sources of "law," in the
broad sense of standards that should guide persons' (or businesses' or
even governments') conduct. The government has no monopoly on
justice.
Although Professor Juenger attacks unilateralism as synonymous with
a form of all-encompassing positivism, he seems to proceed on the assumption that governments can and always should fashion and apply
"better law." 36 His solution to alleged parochialism is essentially to cre33. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. I ask readers to indulge a former high school English teacher in this comparison.
Legal ideas often must push their way into my mind alongside, through, and always signifi-

cantly colored by my earlier immersion in other forms of writing and argument. It is still
true, for example, that I have taught American transcendentalism to far many more 11th

graders than I have taught conflicts to law students. This prior life experience necessarily
shapes (and hopefully improves) my current views.
35. Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRrrINos OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU 665 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992)
36. Compare, however, Professor Juenger's strong insistence that party autonomy
trumps any forum interest in applying its own law to contract disputes. If party autonomy
is a form of government non-intervention, Professor Juenger strongly supports party autonomy as better law. See JUENOER, supra note 2, at 135, 213-20. Party autonomy, however, also could be a form of affirming another state's regulatory interests and the parties'
right to affiliate with that other government. Alternatively, party autonomy, if conditioned
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ate super law. It is not necessarily an improvement on a misguided or
parochial form of justice, however, to create a larger hammer. To compare again to Thoreau, the central tension in the search for justice, multistate or otherwise, is that government is sometimes necessary to improve
justice, but is itself often inherently the source of injustice.37

Theoretically, Thoreau believed that government was unnecessary,
since every person possesses the spark of the divine, and thereby is capable of properly directing his conduct. When men behave as angels there
will be no need for government. But in the meantime, "speak[ing] practically and as a citizen," 38 Thoreau asked for "not at once no government,
but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind
of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it." 39 This realistic aspect of Thoreau's approach insisted
that the government to which he was subject (not in a moral but a literal
sense) apply the best laws possible. Since Thoreau's starting point was
that government most often hindered rather than promoted true morality, however, Thoreau found inherent tension regarding how much justice
(even of the best kind) government should administer or enforce.
For a unilateralist, by implication, the best justice might sometimes be
no justice at all. A unilateral approach does not require that the home
government always administer law to all facts. Cases can be dismissed
because the forum does not believe that it has a right to apply law to this
conduct.4 These ideas of limited sovereignty should, in fact, be at the
heart of the conflicts enterprise. A forum that recognizes that it should
not attempt to solve all of the world's problems should stop trying to act
as if it can. The multilateralism that Professor Juenger criticizes as a vain
search for the most interested jurisdiction is, from a limited sovereignty
perspective, more fundamentally dangerous because it seemingly empowers the forum to apply law despite the recognition that the case does not
directly implicate the forum's regulatory interests. The forum in such situations would do better to leave the parties alone.
Professor Juenger and I apparently agree that it does not make sense
for the forum to substitute another jurisdiction's laws where the forum
on no serious violations of public policy, could be merely an alternative version of forum
law.
37. Thoreau, supra note 35, at 667.
38. It at 668.
39. I& (emphasis in original).
40. Cf Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided For" Case, 75 VA. L. REv. 1045,
1048-64 (1989) (arguing that most "unprovided for" situations are mislabelled because "no
law to apply" means nothing more than dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and further arguing that in most cases called "unprovided for" there
really is law that is meant to apply).
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decides it could apply better law.41 We probably even agree as to the
content of law that courts should apply in many such situations.42 We
probably disagree over whether the forum always has legitimacy to apply
this better law. I believe that the forum always must first ask whether it
should adjudicate the controversy at all. If it should, then it should apply
the best law possible. I would, however, label the law applied "forum
law," while it appears Professor Juenger would resist this labelling.
Is this a difference merely of semantics? I am not so sure. On the one
hand, the historical models Professor Juenger provides for courts fashion-

ing better law involve single sovereigns applying their own laws to situations in which they thought they had a right to rule. Swift v. Tyson, for
example, ultimately is explicable under a view that federal courts have a
constitutional grant of authority to fashion substantive law for diversity
situations.4 3 Similarly, the ius gentium that Professor Juenger so lauds is

in reality Roman courts merely applying Roman law to situations involving Roman trade interests."4 To this extent, then, there is no significant
difference in result between the better law Professor Juenger advocates
and the version of unilateralism I defend here. What he calls better law
without regard to domestic law, I simply call the forum reformulating and
fashioning its own law to govern situations that it determines implicate its
regulatory interests.
41. Professor Juenger, to his credit, also recognizes and discusses the difficulty of a
forum ever being able to apply another's law accurately. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 8386, 157-59. Whereas Professor Juenger apparently sees these problems as support for his
view that courts should develop transcendent substantive law for multistate situations, I
see those truths as support for the idea that the forum never should attempt to apply
another's law. See Cox, supra note 26.
42. I imagine there are also many situations where we do not agree. I am not, however, here arguing for an absolute form of moral relativism (excuse the oxymoron), that
insists that no truth is possible and that we should therefore allow each government to do
as it pleases within its own sphere of influence. To me, such a view brings vested rights
back full circle, but in a relativistic vein.
43. Swift v. Tyson is, in other words, an argument for non-preemptive, but clearly federal common law. Cf Borchers, supra note 32 (arguing that purpose of federal diversity
jurisdiction was to provide access to a different substantive decision maker than would be
available in a state system). Granted, the Swift Court may have seen itself fashioning law
in accord with international rather than domestic principles, and for a larger commercial
market. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) ("The law respecting negotiable
instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero... to be in a great measure,
not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world."), overruled by Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). My point in text is not that the courts involved
viewed themselves as domestic courts, but rather that the legitimacy of the judgments they
issued can best be explained retrospectively as resting on the fact that they did not attempt
to adjudicate beyond their spheres of influence.
44. The fact that these were specialized Roman tribunals that applied law different
from that applied in other contexts does not to my mind make them any less Roman.
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On the other hand, when Professor Juenger discusses the potential for
multistate justice, he seems to advocate a role for courts broader than
that which I condone under my version of unilateralism. In the international context especially, Professor Juenger seems to envision courts that
fashion law apart from any sense of ceded sovereignty and without any
concern for why a particular court should be hearing a particular controversy.45 Professor Juenger's courts apparently derive their power from a
form of the brooding omnipresence in the sky. His hope is the same as
that rejected in Erie-that better law will displace inferior law because of
the combined forces of forum shopping" and the persuasive power of its
superior merit.47
It would be incorrect to dismiss Professor Juenger's arguments as outdated attempts to revive a failed doctrine. In fact, no one has probably
ever explicitly attempted his approach. If I read him correctly, Professor
Juenger encourages courts with open eyes to issue judgments unconstrained by any sense of pursuing forum goals. 48 I do not think Swift v.
Tyson or the praetor peregrinus operated in this manner.4 9 Professor
Juenger's position is post-positivist, post-realist, post-relativist advocacy
of absolutely better law. In the pre-eras, courts may have believed that
they pursued the same truth, or they may have believed that they all were
pursuing truth within their exclusive spheres of influence, or they may
have just imperialistically assumed that their laws were truth. Whatever
their beliefs, courts likely did not believe that they could fashion law
without regard to the interests of either their own state or other states.
Pre-courts did not have to articulate or respond to assumptions about the
importance of state boundaries or sources of legitimacy; post-courts do.
45. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 169.
46. Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,63 TUL. L.
REv. 553, 574 (1989) (arguing that the existence of forum shopping should prompt a reorientation of choice-of-law rules that will serve the ends of substantial justice). I also do
not object to forum shopping, but more for reasons related to what in the United States
context might be discussed under notions of federalism.
47. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 193-94. Erie judged as empirically unsound this
hope that superior federal common law would induce states to change their common law
rules. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938). Ultimately, the notion
that one form of laws will replace another depends not only on persuasive force, but also

on whether other courts will recognize and enforce the judgments forum shoppers have
won. See also supra note 15.
48. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 46,220 (discussing LEX MERCATORIA and Professor
Juenger's promotion of party autonomy); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts:Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1994). I thank Professor Russell Weintraub for drawing this
recent article to my attention.
49. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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Professor Juenger's assertion that modern 5 0 courts may fashion absolutely better law is a bolder version of fashioning better law than the unthinking assumptions and workings of Swift v. Tyson or the ius gentium.
I am ultimately troubled by unfettered discretion to formulate better
law, not because I am against better law, but because I am wary of unfettered discretion. 5 ' As previously intimated, a supporter of limited sovereignty might criticize boundless positivism or boundless better law for
issuing decisions about matters that sometimes would be better left alone.
The key issue that Professor Juenger's version of better law does not address is the need for jurisdictional limits. My form of unilateralism recognizes that because the forum always applies its own law to matters before
it, the forum must have a good reason for hearing a case. The argument
that the forum can formulate wonderful law may not persuade a unilateralist who is wary of governments issuing judgments.
Professor Brilmayer's sometimes criticized 2 arguments regarding the
need for rights based limitations on choice of law5 3 seem similar to what I
criticize Professor Juenger for leaving out. The need for some legitimizing contact with the litigation, or for some relationship with the parties
54
against whom law is applied, serves as an important check on the tendency of a court to adjudicate against the whole world. This limitation
has special relevance when the court, as I believe it is encouraged to do
under Professor Juenger's version of better law, primarily asserts the
need for better law rather than asks, as I believe it should, whether it
should formulate better law for this dispute. Perhaps the differences be50. Or perhaps I should say post-modem, given recent jurisprudential debate.
51. This does not necessarily mean that legislative will should rein in the courts,
whatever "legislative will" means. The argument over which arm of the state should have
precedence in formulating the state's laws is a significantly different argument from
whether the state should be applying its laws, whoever formulates them, to facts that come
before its courts.

52. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and The Holy Grail, Wis. L.

REv. 465 (1991) (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FuTURE DIRECTION); cf Harold G. Maier, Baseballand Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at
Choice of Law, 44 VAND. L. REv. 827 (1991) (arguing that Professor Brilmayer's rights-

based arguments are more appropriate for determining jurisdiction than for choosing law).
I also have severely criticized Professor Brilmayer's unrelated arguments about the helpfulness of game theory to choice-of-law jurisprudence. See Cox, supra note 26, at 72-76.
53. See LEA BRnUMAYER, CoNFuCr OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 191-230 (1991).

54. The check may be minimal, compare Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Mini-

mal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 470-78 (1982) (emphasizing the limited nature, yet
the force of the Court's limits) with Borchers, supra note 32, at 482-89 (criticizing the
weaknesses of rights based limits); but still should force a court to acknowledge and take
responsibility for its decisions, and in some instances prevent the court from taking jurisdiction of cases. It is beyond the scope of this review to sketch out what should be the
limits on a court's jurisdiction to hear cases and apply its law to them.
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tween us are minimal or even non-existent, but I am far from certain of
this. The omission from Choice of Law and Multistate Justice of any discussion of jurisdictional checks, and the painting of unilateralism in a way
that fails to recognize that the forum may change its law (in response to
interstate facts) so as to make forum law better, seem to me significant
omissions from Professor Juenger's strong thesis.
V.

COMPARING "BETTER LAW" AND LEx FORI RESOLUTION OF THE
SAME CASES

One way to explore whether the differences between Professor
Juenger's conflicts methodology and my approach are minimal or significant is to compare the way we would resolve the three cases he uses to
frame Choice of Law and Multistate Justice. In all of the cases, my approach is different from Professor Juenger's, but it would not necessarily
lead to different substantive results. The same result as under Professor
Juenger's better law approach could be achieved under more unilateral
methodology, if, under my approach, the forum first found that it had a
legitimate interest in applying its law to the interstate dispute (i.e., had
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute) and then also agreed to shape forum
law the same way Professor Juenger advocates.
A.

The Paris Air Crash Case

Professor Juenger believes that mass torts and complex litigation cases
decisively demonstrate the advantages of a teleological approach.5 5 In
the Ermenonville disaster, 6 a Turkish commercial aircraft designed and
manufactured in the United States, carrying primarily non-Americans,
crashed after takeoff from Paris, killing all 333 passengers and 13 crew
members aboard. The plaintiffs sued in United States courts and primarily alleged defective design and manufacture.57 The California judge
before whom all United States cases (involving 337 decedents) were consolidated ruled that California law governed the issues of liability5 8 and

damages.
55. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-ofLaw Rules, 54 LA. L. REV. 907 (1994); Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Con-

flict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 105.
56. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975); In re
Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 423 F. Supp. 367 (C.D. Cal. 1976); JUENGER, supra note 2,
at 2, 48-52, 208-13.
57. The plaintiffs also sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
alleged improper certification of the airplane or failure to inspect and/or require modifications before it was sold abroad.
58. See Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 742.
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Professor Juenger believes that this judge explicitly and transparently
should have assumed the role of multinational decision maker and should
not have manipulated Klaxon and Van Dusen to seek a particular substantive law.59 Freedom from positivist constraints would have allowed
the judge to evaluate and compare various nations' compensation systems
critically and to fashion one best suited for air crashes. In Professor
Juenger's view, the law that most fully compensates plaintiffs is obviously
the appropriate law.60 He contends that the California federal judge in
Air Crash should not have pretended to apply a mixture of federal and
California pro-plaintiff law, but instead explicitly should have shaped international law to promote plaintiff recovery.
I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Juenger's insistence that deceptive conflicts rules should not mask the real basis for a court's decision. If
a trial court can pretend to consider other sovereigns' interests while promoting only forum interests, or if a judge can manipulate conflicts rules to
achieve a substantive result out of line with supposedly governing precedent, there is something wrong with the conflicts system. In fact, the Air
Crash judge seemed to recast domicile-emphasizing, California interest
analysis decisions, 61 ignored differences in the states' choice-of-law systems from which pieces of the consolidated litigation originated,62 and
created federal interests in the litigation that would not withstand Challoner criticism. 63 Such masquerades should be avoided and exposed

rather than encouraged.
These deceptions arise because the courts whose substantive law allegedly has been applied do not necessarily review judges who determine the
applicable substantive law. As the judge in Air Crash emphasized,
The law on "choice of law".. . is a veritable jungle, which, if the
law can be found out, leads not to a "rule of action" but a reign
of chaos dominated in each case by the judge's "informed
guess" as to what some other state than the one in which he sits
would hold its law to be."
Professor Juenger and I apparently agree that it would be better for appellate courts to review substantive content rather than the way lower
courts apply inherently manipulable and unpredictable conflicts rules.
59. See JUENGEIR, supra note 2, at 210-12.
60. See id. at 212. He also asserts that the International Encyclopedia's promotion of
such tort law represents a well reasoned justification for that law, as well as an indication of
the trend in that direction.
61. See ParisAir Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 741-45.
62. See id. at 749.
63. See id at 745-47.
64. Id at 739 (emphasis in original).
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Under his better law approach, both the trial and appellate Air Crash
courts would focus only on fashioning a substantive rule that best serves
justice in air crash cases.
Under lex fori, a trial court similarly always knows that its decisions
will be reviewed for substantive law content.65 Under lex fori, however,
courts cannot shape substantive law for multistate cases without explicitly
acknowledging that this shaping is a matter of forum policy. Both Professor Juenger and I agree that the Air Crash judge improperly invented a
federal concern to remove the case from normal California law on recovery. Professor Juenger acknowledges, but does not emphasize, that this is
a tragedy for the development of California law. A more straightforward
substantive opinion, Professor Juenger correctly contends, "would have
helped the California Supreme Court to decide [a subsequent case raising
related issue] and might have prompted it to scuttle entirely the outdated
Lex fori forces the court to recrule that disallows recovery for grief."
ognize now that it is always making forum substantive policy. It is not
just that the Air Crash case might help California develop better law in a
future case. When the Air Crash court properly acknowledges that it has
power only to apply California law, the Air Crash case directly becomes
the vehicle through which California courts can reshape California tort
law.
Under Professor Juenger's approach, on the other hand, once the dispute assumes an international characterization, forum policy apparently
is abandoned and the sole concern becomes what rule is best for all such
cases, regardless of where they are brought.6 7 Instead, I believe it is important to question why a particular forum should hear the case. In a
case involving a foreign airline crash carrying primarily foreign passen65. I set aside Erie situations as beyond the scope of this article.
66. JUENGER, supra note 2, at 212.
67. Professor Juenger's book is actually ambiguous regarding how broadly he would
look for sources to fashion appropriate substantive law. My assumption that he would not
be constrained to any particular group of sovereigns' laws but would use existing sovereigns' laws only as inspiration to fashion appropriate international law gives him the benefit of the doubt. In fact, Professor Juenger sometimes promotes alternative reference law.
i.e., using the best law available from those of any of the arguably interested jurisdictions.
See id. at 195-97; cf.id.at 213. A heading that reads "The Ermenonville Disaster: Alternative Reference" in fact precedes the Air Crash discussion. Id. at 208. I read Professor
Juenger as only offering alternative reference as a way station for judges who may not yet
feel comfortable taking the full plunge into teleology. Alternative reference is antithetical
to a truly teleological approach, since alternative reference limits the judge to a selection

from domestic laws, none of which, according to Professor Juenger's larger thesis, may
actually be designed to address international problems. If Professor Juenger is seriously
promoting alternative reference methodology in its own right, this would be a serious inconsistency in his choice-of-law system.
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gers, the court should have to justify the forum interest in applying law to
the whole case. Professor Juenger seems comfortable with the Air Crash
pro-plaintiff recovery result because he thinks that any court hearing such
a case should fashion this substantive result. I am comfortable with the
result because California had a right to impose its recovery law against
manufacturers and designers significantly connected to California. Moreover, I also believe that pro-plaintiff recovery law strikes the best policy
balance between manufacturers and victims for products liability tort
claims. By jumping to the policy balance without first considering
whether the forum may apply its law to the particular case before it, Professor Juenger's approach would allow anyone anywhere to hear complex
litigation cases.
The Air Crash case actually is an easy one for application of forum
(California) law because the plaintiffs brought the suit solely in products
liability," the defendants acted in California regarding products liability
harms,69 and the non-California airline later stipulated to a negotiated
amount of liability on cross-claims not based on products liability.70 I
confess, however, that most complex litigation fact patterns will not allow
so cleanly for a single forum to claim that every aspect of the case triggers
its regulatory interests. Had the Air Crash plaintiffs been freed of the
Warsaw Convention constraints 7 ' and able to sue the airline for negligence, California would not easily have claimed that it could apply its
airline conduct laws to Turkish airline actions so tangentially connected
or arguably unconnected to California.
For Professor Juenger, the obvious non-local nature of complex litigation merely writes the conflicts problem large. In his view, a conflicts
problem inherently transcends one state's or nation's jurisdiction, and
therefore requires larger law. Complex litigation's obvious square peg fit
with the round holes of conflicts rules (including Erie constraints) confirms that we should abandon those outmoded positivist methods of addressing conflicts problems and instead embrace a frankly transcendent
and teleological approach.
There is, however, a possible opposite response to the problems raised
by complex litigation. Professor Juenger's assumption that it is beneficial
for a single forum or a single tribunal to decide all issues arising out of,
68. This was done to skirt the Warsaw Convention limitations on recovery against the
airline. See id at 208.
69. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737, 744 (C.D. Cal.

1975).
70. See id at 738.

71. See supra notes 68-70; see also JUENGER, supra note 2, at 49-52
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for example, an air crash could be challenged as unsound.72 It is at least
logically possible to argue that the basic problem with multidistrict complex litigation is that we allow it to exist at all. Perhaps we should not
have multidistrict panels that attempt to consolidate into a single forum
pieces of litigation that the same sovereign's laws cannot govern. If we
took limited jurisdiction seriously, perhaps a sovereign's courts should
hear only those pieces or aspects of litigation that its laws can govern.
I admit that such a view of limited jurisdiction runs counter to notions

of convenience, judicial economy, and same transaction or occurrence
logic that have dominated civil litigation and federal court efforts of the
modem era.73 Professor Juenger openly embraces the modem trends.

He also correctly recognizes that once a judge has de facto substantive
control of complex litigation, we can expect that judge to fashion substantive law, regardless of what the conflicts "rules" say. Both Professor
Juenger and I believe that we should openly recognize this reality rather

than mask it by conflicts rules that are inherently capable of manipulation. The main difference between our perspectives is that whereas Professor Juenger views cases such as In re "Agent Orange" ProductLiability
Litigation74 as a model for future judges, 75 I view such results as reason to
pause and to rethink whether we are headed in the right direction.
B.

The Damaged Oil Rig Case

Professor Juenger correctly contends that depriving a court of other-

wise valid jurisdiction poses problems for conflicts theorists who empha72. A mass disaster case, such as an airline crash, often can fit within the regulatory
interests of a single jurisdiction (either the place of injury or place of the design and manufacture). The combined efforts of dispersed actors, such as in DES or asbestos cases, that
create diffused harms are the more difficult type of complex litigation scenario.
73. Neither is there room in this brief review emphasizing Professor Juenger's approaches to detail why we should consider reversing consolidation efforts that today we
take for granted, nor room to explain the extent to which I am willing to follow to conclusion the implications of such an approach. In a future article I hope to explore the
problems inherent in consolidating, through complex litigation procedures, cases that one
sovereign's laws cannot govern in good faith.
74. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In this
case veterans and their dependents filed health claims for their exposure to defoliants in
southeast Asia. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously
reversed Judge Weinstein's decision that preemptive federal common law should apply. In
In re Agent Orange Judge Weinstein asserted that, under Van Dusen v. Barrack, each individual jurisdiction that had transferred a case to him would adopt a national consensus law
of liability, which, not being extant, Judge Weinstein would fashion particularly for this
case. As in most complex litigation matters, once the judge had made substantive law
rulings, the bulk of the cases settled.
75. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 165-67.
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size sovereignty. 76 I find The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 7 1 to be
indeed a hard case to swallow, and I read the combined message of The
Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute78 negatively rather than positively. Although Professor Juenger also disagrees with Shute, 79 he generally promotes party autonomy as better law, believes The Bremen Court
correctly emphasized practicality over doctrine,' 0 and considers presumptions against party autonomy parochial and contrary to modem commercial trends and necessities. 8 '
In The Bremen, the Zapata Off-Shore Company sued the German
owner of the tug, M/S Bremen, for allegedly damaging an oil rig the
Bremen towed during stormy weather from Louisiana through the Gulf
of Mexico towards Italy. When the Bremen, at Zapata's request, towed
the damaged rig to Tampa, Zapata sued the German owner and attached
the tug in this American port. The owner argued that the action should
be dismissed because a clause in their contract provided for exclusive jurisdiction in English courts. Alternatively, the owner argued that another
contract clause relieved the owner of any negligence liability. The United
States Supreme Court directed that the case be dismissed based on the
forum selection clause.
Professor Juenger praises the Court for enforcing the forum selection
clause without concern for what substantive law the courts would apply,'
and without requiring that the selected forum have a direct interest in the
controversy.8 Certainly, inconsistent nation-state laws pose a problem
for international, especially commercial international, actors who desire
certainty in their business dealings. Allowing parties whose transactions
cross state boundaries to stipulate their own law sometimes gives them
what they substantively want, plus the predictability that they may want
even more. Professor Juenger contends that such party autonomy presumptively constitutes better law.
Professor Juenger recognizes an exception to party autonomy when an
apparent agreement exists between parties of unequal bargaining
76. See id at 213.
77. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
78. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In Shute, the Court enforced form language in a passenger
ticket for a cruise from Los Angeles to Puerto Vallerte, Mexico, against a Washington state
passenger. It required the consumer to bring all suits against the cruise line company in its
American headquarters state, Florida.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See
See
See
See

JUENOER, supra note 2, at 219 n.1345.
id at 215.
id at 214-15.
it at 215-17.

83. See id. at 215.
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To his credit, Professor Juenger also recognizes that the pres-

ence within his theory of "two opposing substantive policies-party autonomy and the protection of the weaker party-offers food for
thought.""5 It is unclear how much protection from apparent agreement

Professor Juenger would give to a weaker party or exactly how he defines
a weaker party. If he means only that unequal bargaining power raises
questions about whether parties really did agree, this does not yet prove
why law upon which parties really do agree is the best law to govern their
transactions.
It is not obvious under a teleological system why a law is "better" when

it allows the parties to do what they want, even only between themselves. 6 Professor Juenger's version of party autonomy makes most teleological sense when foolish state sovereigns prevent the parties from
choosing a superior law. In situations, however, where the parties deliberately choose an "inferior" law rather than the best substantive law
available, should not the judicial system paternalistically intervene to insist on a more just form of justice than to what the parties have agreed?
A lex fori approach that emphasizes limited sovereignty better explains
why party autonomy to choose substantive law should be presumed to be
good, or at least why such party agreements might cause a court to pause

seriously before applying its normal version of forum law. Limited sovereignty necessarily implies a high degree of party autonomy. The state
does not presumptively have a right to intrude on peoples' lives, since
others beside the state can fashion justice. Regardless of the content of
law that parties use to govern themselves outside of the judicial system,

the states might properly leave the parties alone. State legislatures did
84. Id at 219.
85. Id (emphasis added).
86. The last qualifier is an important one. TWo parties' agreement regarding the applicable law for their relations affecting others should not bind the others when the others
seek better law. A bank and an organized crime syndicate, for example, might agree to
launder illegally obtained proceeds offshore; this agreement should not bind those who
originally obtained the proceeds or those affected by the crimes from asserting rights
against the proceeds. An agreement by all parties in a products liability manufacturing and
distribution chain, including the purchasing consumer, should not bind another person ultimately hurt by a defective product. I do not understand Professor Juenger to argue
otherwise.
Nevertheless, although Professor Juenger derides state interests as intruding upon party
autonomy, it may be that state interests are a surrogate for the interests of others affected
by a contract between two principals. Even in the case of a towing agreement between two
commercial enterprises, the dispute's resolution surely affected others. I do not necessarily
endorse the technique, but I understand this to be the real justification behind interest
analysis recognition of state interests outside of the principals involved in a dispute.
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not intend their contract or tort law to apply in all situations, just in those
that parties cannot resolve on their own.
A lex fori focus, however, also emphasizes that courts must always
measure party agreements against the forum's views about the propriety
of negotiations leading to an agreement and the content of law actually
selected. Forum selection clauses are suspect because they are inherently
contradictory regarding the parties' faith in governments' abilities to fashion law governing their conduct. The parties are not unequivocally saying
to government, "stay out of our lives because you have no right to be
here," but rather "we trust only one particular government to treat us
fairly." Behind the supposed neutrality of the forum selection clause
often stands the desire to avoid application of a particular sovereign's
law.
This is arguably what happened in The Bremen. An American corporation owned the towed rig and used it off the coast of Louisiana. One
might legitimately expect an American admiralty court to exercise jurisdiction over disputes regarding such rig's proper towing. Precedent on
point held that United States admiralty courts should invalidate clauses
attempting to absolve a shipper of negligence liability.8 7 As Professor
Juenger correctly notes, The Bremen provided the Court an opportunity
to rethink and overrule this prior precedent.s It declined. The Court did
not directly reshape or reconsider forum law, even though the case directly implicated forum regulatory policies. Instead, The Bremen imported needless inconsistency into virtually identical party autonomy
situations. A party who places a forum selection clause in an agreement
to avoid forum law will achieve that result, whereas a party who explicitly
"chooses" non-forum law via a separate clause but includes no forum selection clause, will likely get "normal" United States law.
It would have been better if the Court had directly reexamined
whether commercial parties' agreements should cause a court to rethink
or reshape its "normal" substantive law policies. Under a lex fori view,
when a court enforces a private agreement according to its substantive
terms, this converts the private agreement into a form of forum law. In
situations where the state only weakly believes in its substantive common
law rules (treating them as default rules) and more strongly believes that
people should fulfill their promises to each other, the state may wish to
enforce private agreements not egregiously at odds with normal default
provisions. In fact, this is the state's larger forum law regarding contracts,
not the particular default rules. On the other hand, if the state feels less
87. See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
88. See JUENGJER, supra note 2, at 217-18 & n.1335.
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strongly about the value of holding parties to their promises, or feels
more strongly that its policy judgments about rule content should be implemented, the state might properly tell the parties that the only law it
can apply is normal default forum law.
Whichever way the court would resolve this tension between encouraging parties to determine their own fate and ensuring that forum rule content is always the best available, a lex fori forum would take seriously the
responsibility to do justice between the parties. Normally, this would
mean keeping the case before the tribunal and applying either the parties'
law or some other version of forum law. 9 Dismissing a case based solely
on a forum selection clause evades judicial responsibility to determine
what truly constitutes justice. The predictable result is the reflexive and
arguably unjust enforcement of forum selection clauses that the United
States Supreme Court has adopted in The Bremen's wake. 90
C. "Foreigner"Divorces
When Professor Juenger describes the benefits of teleology in marital
dispute resolutions, he could as easily be speaking of the benefits of lex
fori. Indeed, as his subsection heading indicates, lex fori and better law
appear to be equivalent terms when referring to the proper way to decide
who should be able to divorce whom.91 As Professor Juenger concedes,
"Since few states are prepared to grant divorces in multistate cases on
terms more favorable than those made available by domestic law, in this
92
particular context teleology spells forum law preference."
Accordingly, I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Juenger's criticism
of rigid and dogmatic European divorce rules, which attempted to hold
persons to the more restrictive divorce laws of their former residence or
of their continuing nationality. 93 The mistake of such conflicts rules is to
sacrifice forum judgment about appropriate divorce standards on the al89. A forum might dismiss a case, knowing that another forum would apply substantive law, where it simply did not believe that its courts should grant relief between the
parties for such disputes. In the same way that the forum usually leaves the parties to
resolve their disputes extrajudicially, such dismissal with knowledge that another forum
might entertain the suit would treat other forums merely as extrajudicial resolvers of
disputes.
90. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
91. See JUENcER, supra note 2, at 220.

92. Id at 228; see also id. at 223 ("forum-centered approaches are far better suited
[than classical approaches] to accommodate the relevant societal concerns"); id. at 226
("resulting judge-made rules were satisfactory only because of their intrinsic forum
preference").
93. See id at 220, 228.
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tar of mythical comity or supposed unity of status based on an arbitrary
connecting factor (nationality). A forum with which persons are at current significantly connected should treat all those significantly connected
alike when deciding if divorce is appropriate. This is merely another way
of saying that when a situation implicates forum regulatory interests, the
forum should apply forum law.
In the Cardo case, Professor Juenger applauds the Swiss court's decision to apply divorce-favoring law,' asserting that this is an example of
better law combining with forum bias to produce a correct result. 95 Lex
fori logic alone could as easily and correctly have achieved this result.
The Cardo spouses lived in Switzerland, although the wife retained her
French nationality and the husband retained his Italian nationality.
Under lex fori analysis, a Swiss court properly could allow the parties to
divorce under Swiss law without regard to whether France or Italy would
recognize the divorce. Whereas the Cardo court apparently applied
French law to the extent it conformed with Swiss law,' under lex fori, the
court should just straightforwardly apply Swiss law because the case involved Swiss domiciliaries. The reason to compare and consult foreign
law is not to give it any effect in its own right, but to look for suggestions
to improve Swiss law. The end result is neither an international divorce
law suited to all people and all places nor limited just to those who happen to have interstate connections. Rather, the end result is a law limited
to Swiss domiciliaries that nevertheless is the most fair divorce law on the
merits that the Swiss court can fashion.
VI.

OTHER PLUSES AND MINUSES (OR

1 1/2

CHEERS FOR JUENGER'S

EMPHASES ON HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE LAW)

Although not central to his argument for better law, Professor Juenger
runs as sub-theme through his book that many modern scholars have neglected the writings of continental and other foreign nation scholars regarding choice of law. In a variation of Santayana's famous truism,97
Professor Juenger repeatedly argues that those who have failed to study

the history of continental conflicts theorists will replicate their doomed
mistakes.

This emphasis on historical and comparative conflicts theory is both a
strength and weakness of the work. As a strength, these emphases mean
94. See itt at 3.
95. See id. at 220.

96. See id. at 222.
97. "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George
Santayana, in JoHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 703 (Emily Morrison Beck ed.,
15th ed. 1980).
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that Professor Juenger usually gets to the heart of any competing theory
by linking it to a similar theory that has already been propounded abroad.
In this way, Professor Juenger highlights for his readers a wonderful
wealth of names and materials to serve as starting points for further foreign exploration. I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Juenger's implied comparativist message that one better understands one's own
conflict culture as he bathes in the writings of a different time period or
culture. Distance from home via temporary immersion in the less familiar brings perspective that hopefully leads to insight into larger truth. But
Professor Juenger goes too far in two related implications: (1) that no one
who has not similarly immersed himself in conflicts history and comparative conflicts writings can speak with authority; and (2) that once one has
immersed himself in this literature, he will realize that none of the newer
theorists say anything worthwhile.9"
It is difficult for one like myself not yet among the "baptized" to refute
the implication of a lack of sufficient immersion in proper conflicts materials. This difficulty is probably my main discomfort about this (or any
other) form of elitism. How can one know that the claimed essential
knowledge is really relevant until and unless one has mastered it? And
must one then master everything before one can speak? The practical
academic pressures of publication require conflicts theorists to write without having read everything relevant. More fundamentally, it seems inappropriate to demand that others compete with you only on your terms.
On the other hand, it would be obvious pretension for any theorist to
claim supreme importance and absolute originality for his own works, especially when the universe of writing is so large and the scope for application literally is the universe. Perhaps this pretension is primarily what
irks Professor Juenger about his non-comparativist colleagues,99 a com98. See JUENGER, supra note 2, at 43-46, 138.

99. Professor Juenger seems most pointedly to attack Brainerd Currie for allegedly
being both unread and unoriginal. As someone who did not pursue conflicts issues while
Professor Currie was still alive, I sometimes am at a loss to understand the depth of feeling,
both positive and negative, that those who either battled with or fought alongside him feel
towards him. I suspect that some of the vituperation has as much to do with personality
conflicts as with the merits of Currie's conflicts works. At any rate, based solely on my
print acquaintance with Brainerd Currie, it seems Professor Juenger's criticisms are too
harsh. Currie seems always to have acknowledged his debt to those from whom he borrowed ideas or to those who influenced him. That he was unaware of other scholars to
whom he does not acknowledge debt seems only to indicate that he independently came up
with the amalgamation of ideas that became interest analysis. The fact that Currie is a
forceful writer and publicist of his own ideas seems non-unique to law professors. If Professor Wichter said the same thing, he apparently did not say it as persuasively. Because
the courts of Professor W1tchter's era did not largely adopt his ideas does not necessarily
mean American courts were wrong to jump on the Currie bandwagon. The ideas of any
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plaint with which I could concur. But to borrow from another set of transcendentalist essays, one need not always travel to discover truth;1°° one
can learn large truths from diligent planting in backyard pedestrian
plots.101 It seems, therefore, a fairer demand to insist only that the nonbaptized hold and offer their theories with tentativeness and humility,
recognizing that their views might be modified, confirmed, deepened, or
abandoned as they gain different and additional insights. The conflicts
theorist who knows only twentieth-century American writers would undoubtedly improve her perspective through wider reading. Her writing,
however, is not necessarily wrong because she is not fully read, nor
should she necessarily remain silent when she thinks she has something to
say.
Accordingly, I think that Professor Juenger is also only partly right
about there being nothing new under the conflicts sun. If prior theorists
truly have already said everything about conflicts, then all of us, Professor
Juenger included, need only cite the writings of these purported greats of
previous centuries. Professor Juenger's better law doctrine, however, is
not merely a rehashing of the ius gentium. I have previously suggested
that one of the particularly bold aspects of Professor Juenger's thought is
that he is a post-proponent of absolutely better law.' 2 Thus, he argues
for better law as an alternative to what he considers failed experiments
with other theories. Necessarily, therefore, his knowledge of those failed
experiments is part of his rationale for why better law is now truly better.
To the extent that times and circumstances change, a theory that speaks
to the current state of conflict affairs is never quite the same as previous
incarnations that bore the same name.
A more modest version of the same point is to insist at the very least
that there is value in every generation applying and therefore making
alive theories that previously spoke to other fact patterns important to
previous generations. Whether newer writers really develop new theory
or only apply old theory to new contexts, what they have to say still can
be important to courts deciding what to do with present cases, and to
professors attempting to create better conficts of law theories. Professor
Juenger, however, largely omits from his book the newer variations on
theorist should be criticized primarily on their merits rather than on the basis that others
previously propounded in similar form.
100. See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE 81-83 (Gene Dekovic ed., 1975)
("Traveling is a fool's paradise .... My giant goes with me wherever I go.").
101. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 326-28 (J. Lyndon Shanley ed., Princeton
Univ. Press 1971).
102. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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conflicts themes that scholars of the last two to three decades have
103
offered.
I do not fault Professor Juenger for not including more recent writers
to the same extent he cites his contemporaries or predecessors-every
work must have reasonable cutoffs. But to the extent he implies that he
omits more recent American writers because they have nothing worthwhile to say, he is probably mistaken." ° Still, as I have emphasized earlier, the Juengerian insistence that there are no really new conflicts ideas
is a partial strength as well as weakness of MultistateJustice. If I quarrel
with Professor Juenger's selective footnote omissions, it is still refreshing
to be reminded constantly and convincingly in text that at its heart, the
conflicts doctrines are indeed variations on a few themes. These themes
can be set forth simply rather than esoterically, and debated at their foundational level without regard necessarily to who should receive credit for
the original or quintessential promulgation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Choice of Law and MultistateJustice succeeds because it addresses conflicts doctrine at a foundational level, argues that one conflicts approach
has more merit than others, and attempts to address counter-arguments
in a historical and comparativist framework as well as via logical refutation. Although I disagree with Professor Juenger's ultimate conclusions, I
wholeheartedly endorse the meaningful mental dialogue his book requires in response to its reading. This book is a fitting monument to a
man who has contributed and continues to contribute much to the conflicts debate. It is must reading for anyone who writes and teaches in the
field.
103. Certainly Professor Juenger cites to post-1970 American works. But aside from
citations to his own works or to those of his pupil Professor Borchers, most of these citations either have an international emphasis or are works that emphasize the inadequacies
of interest analysis. In short, Professor Juenger's citations to the most recent American
conflicts scholarship are selective at best and at worst seem to be frozen in the time period
of Currie, Cavers, and Cook.
104. This footnote is where I should cite all recent works or authors to which Professor
Juenger should have responded but did not in his monograph. My goals are much less
ambitious. Since I would offend anyone not here included by an omission, I mention only
examples indicating that others have found the current American conflicts landscape less
barren than Professor Juenger indicates. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the
Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L. J. 1, 2 n.5 (1991)
(citing works by Brilmayer, Dane, Kramer, and Singer); Sterk, supra note 12, at 949-50

(speaking of a recent "renaissance in choice of law theory," citing works by Brilmayer,
Dane, Kramer, and Weinberg as examples of reconceptualizing scholarships, and citing
additional works by Laycock, Mullenix, Posnak, Sedler, Singer, Weintraub, and Juenger as
indicating vigor of current debate).

